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For most of the current period of legal thought, legal realism or
instrumentalism have been the strongest forces at work in the field.1
This has coincided with the rise in popularity of the theories of deon-
tology or consequentialism in the field of moral philosophy.  How-
ever, since Elizabeth Anscombe’s famous 1958 paper Modern Moral
Philosophy was published,2 the theory of virtue ethics3 has captured a
small but growing group of adherents.  Moral philosophy, of course, is
necessarily and intricately tied to legal theory, and because of this, a
corresponding theory is slowly developing in legal academia.  For
example, Lawrence Solum has already written of the effect of virtue
jurisprudence on some areas of the law,4 and together with Colin Far-
relly, has called for a return to the principles of virtue jurisprudence
as the basis of law.5  At best, this project is in utero.6
* J.D. Candidate 2013, Notre Dame Law School; B.A. 2010, Thomas Aquinas
College.  I would like to thank Professors Rick Garnett and Jeffery Pojanowski for
their input and guidance, and my wife, Marie, for her love and support.
1 VIRTUE JURISPRUDENCE 1 (Colin Farrelly & Lawrence B. Solum eds., 2008).
2 G.E.M. Anscombe, Modern Moral Philosophy, 33 PHIL. 1 (1958).
3 I use this name, as Anscombe and those who came after her have, to mean a
moral philosophy which promotes the inculcation of human virtue as its primary nat-
ural telos.
4 See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, The Aretaic Turn in Constitutional Theory, 70 BROOK.
L. REV. 475 (2005) [hereinafter Solum, The Aretaic Turn] (arguing that the process by
which we choose judges who will handle constitutional disputes ought to be focused
on the character and virtue of the nominees, rather than political or public policy
reasons); Lawrence B. Solum, Natural Justice, 51 AM. J. JURIS. 65 (2006) [hereinafter
Solum, Natural Justice] (arguing that Justice is natural and good to humans and is
therefore a natural part of virtue jurisprudence); Lawrence B. Solum, Virtue Jurispru-
dence: A Virtue-Centered Theory of Judging, 34 METAPHILOSOPHY 178 (2003) [hereinafter
Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence] (arguing that the best judges are not necessarily those
who share our policy beliefs, but those who best possess the sets of virtues required of
one who must judge).
5 VIRTUE JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 1.
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Virtue ethics is not, of course, a new field.  In one form, its roots
in western thought can be traced as far as Plato;7 however, the treat-
ment given to it by his pupil Aristotle received more attention and is
generally regarded as the true birth of the theory.8  Most early Chris-
tians disregarded Aristotelian and other Greek philosophies as pagan,
and therefore the theory of virtue and law proposed by Aristotle fell
into disfavor among western cultures.9  The next serious treatment of
the theory was in the medieval period, when St. Thomas Aquinas
revived peripatetic thought and gave his own detailed account of how
exactly the flourishing of human virtue was the goal of government, as
well as what a regime was and was not permitted to do in pursuit of
this goal.10
This outline, while by no means exhaustive of the literature on
the interaction of virtue and the law, provides a brief sketch of the
primary influences on the field of virtue ethics from the pre-Enlight-
enment western canon.  Until the recent treatment of the field, it had
remained largely undeveloped from these roots.  Recently, as noted
above, some have attempted to build on this tradition and adapt our
current legal system to virtue ethics, thereby creating a framework
which most actively and effectively promotes the common good.11  In
many areas of the law, it remains to be seen or fully explored what sort
6 See id. at 1–2 (“[W]e ought to say that the version of virtue jurisprudence
offered in this brief introduction paper is hardly full blown.”).
7 See generally PLATO, THE REPUBLIC (R.E. Allen trans., Yale Univ. Press 2006) (c.
380 B.C.E.) (discussing Plato’s beliefs about the proper order of the good city, the
good man, and the definition of justice).
8 See generally ARISTOTLE, Nichomachean Ethics, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE
935 (Richard McKeon ed., W.D. Ross trans., Random House 1941) (c. 350 B.C.E.)
[hereinafter ARISTOTLE, Ethics] (discussing the nature of virtue generally, as well as
how virtue comes to be in humans); ARISTOTLE, Politics, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARIS-
TOTLE 1127, supra [hereinafter ARISTOTLE, Politics] (discussing the nature and order
of the good city and in what each of its elements should consist).
9 See Ralph McInerny & John O’Callaghan, Saint Thomas Aquinas, in STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2010), available at http://plato.
stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/aquinas (“Thomas . . . countered both the
Averroistic interpretations of Aristotle and the Franciscan tendency to reject Greek
philosophy.  The result was a new modus vivendi between faith and philosophy which
survived until the rise of the new physics.”).
10 See ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, Summa Theologica Part I–II, in 2 BASIC WRITINGS OF ST.
THOMAS AQUINAS 742–805 (Anton C. Pegis ed., Random House 1945) (c. 1274) [here-
inafter AQUINAS, Summa]; see also ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, ON KINGSHIP TO THE KING OF
CYPRUS (I. Th. Eschmann ed., Gerald B. Phelan trans., Hyperion Press 1979) (c. 1267)
[hereinafter AQUINAS, ON KINGSHIP].
11 See generally VIRTUE JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1 (containing essays by numer-
ous authors on how we ought to approach modern legal matters with an eye to the
virtue jurisprudence tradition).
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of effect virtue jurisprudence might have and what the broader impli-
cations will be.
One of these areas is constitutional interpretation.  While the
effect of virtue jurisprudence on constitutional adjudication has been
explored,12 the question of whether or not the Constitution may rea-
sonably be interpreted as consistent with the ends of law according to
virtue jurisprudence is valid and as yet little-discussed.  If the Constitu-
tion is incompatible with virtue jurisprudence, then we must choose
whether to have our cake or eat it.  Such a discovery would not, of
course, invalidate the theory of virtue jurisprudence; it would instead
require us to conclude that the Constitution does not have a sturdy
basis in a valid moral philosophy.13  For many Americans, this choice
between the Constitution and virtue ethics is easy: the Constitution
functions neatly enough and is dear enough that it is the clear selec-
tion over what is, to most Americans, a nebulous and relatively
unknown philosophical mindset.
This Note will argue, however, that the two are not only compati-
ble but ideally paired.  This is not to say that adopting virtue jurispru-
dence as the philosophical foundation of the Constitution would be
without consequence.  Rather, it will argue that the Constitution is
compatible with virtue jurisprudence if the reader interprets it in a
particular way which is consistent with the founders’ general
worldview and beliefs.  This Note will not attempt to establish that vir-
tue jurisprudence is a superior system to any other, nor that the con-
stitutional interpretation it provides ought to be the preferred
method.  Instead it will give a theoretical framework by which we as a
people might base our Constitution on virtue jurisprudence, if we
desired to do so.
Part I of this Note provides definitions and explanations of the
terms “virtue ethics” and “virtue jurisprudence.”  It examines the his-
tory of these theories as they have developed in western thought.  Part
II discusses how the Constitution can be grounded in the principles of
virtue jurisprudence.  It examines how the Constitution can be used
to fulfill the goal of allowing its citizens to live excellent lives.  First, it
surveys the current constitutional jurisprudence and how in many
cases it is counterproductive of the goal of producing virtuous citi-
zens.  Next, it discusses how, in early America, the people possessed
certain traits of character which were highly desirable, conducive, and
necessary to a free state.  It uses these characteristics to understand
12 See Solum, The Aretaic Turn, supra note 4.
13 This supposes, of course, that the truth of any one theory of moral philosophy
is exclusive of others, a proposition which I do not defend here.
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why the Constitution was written as it was, and why it would be in our
best interests to ensure that these traits survive in America.  Finally, it
examines how the dual division of powers—federal against state and
the three federal branches against each other—can functionally frus-
trate the development of vice in lawmakers in any branch at any level.
I. FROM PLATO TO SOLUM: 2400 YEARS OF VIRTUE
ETHICS AND JURISPRUDENCE
Virtue ethics is one of three current popular approaches to moral
philosophy.14  It emphasizes as the measure of actions whether those
actions will produce excellent character, rather than judging actions
by adherence to a set of rules (the deontological approach) or the
consequences they produce (the utilitarian or consequentialist
approach).15  This brief description is the modern formulation of the
theory, but it has remained substantively intact since it was first
articulated.
In the earliest treatment of virtue and the state at length, Plato
gave an account of the four cardinal virtues and how they come to be
in both men and the state.16  He named justice, fortitude, prudence,
and temperance as cardinal virtues and further claims that the state
must aim to foster each of these virtues in the respective class where it
is necessary.17  This is of limited use for the purposes of this Note
because virtually no one, either in 1787 or today, thinks that American
society has or should have designated strata which do not permit verti-
cal movement from one to the other.  The British aristocracy had
been a partial cause of the American Revolution.  It is, however, the
first major treatment of the cultivation of virtue as the end of the state
and served as a foundation for the firm establishment of the theory by
Plato’s pupil.
Aristotle remains one of the most well-known philosophers in
human history and wrote extensively on the nature of virtue and virtu-
ous activity.  In the Nichomachean Ethics, he concluded that virtuous
action was the greatest achievement man could reach and therefore
14 Rosalind Hursthouse, Virtue Ethics, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY,
supra note 9, available at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/ethics-
virtue.
15 Id.
16 See PLATO, supra note 7, at 121–31, 141–47.
17 Id.  Plato believed that there were or ought to be three main classes of man—
producers, warriors, and rulers—and that each of these ought to be defined and in
some way separated from the others. Id.
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should also be his primary goal in life.18  Building on this conclusion,
he designated the inculcation of virtue in the populace as the primary
goal of both the state and the household.19  Later in the Politics, when
studying the different types of political government, he referred to
three distinct parts of government: the deliberative body, the magis-
tracy, and the judicial body—a division which will sound familiar to
any student of American political science.20  This brief overview of
Aristotle’s teachings on virtue describes its essential points as they will
relate to the topic of this Note.
St. Thomas Aquinas, in his Treatise on Law, built upon Aristotle’s
conclusions about the ends of government.  First, regarding the
nature of law itself, he determined that it is “an ordinance of reason
for the common good, promulgated by him who has the care of the
community . . . .”21  Any such law, he further argues, will result in the
creation of men who are good with respect to the ends of their partic-
ular government, for “the proper effect of law is to lead its subjects to
their proper virtue . . . .”22  In a well-ordered state, these laws result in
the creation of citizens who are capable of and well-suited to attaining
the common good—and this in turn will require that the citizens pos-
sess the cardinal virtues.23
St. Thomas’s conclusions about the purpose of law in this regard
are not particularly different from those of Aristotle, though his argu-
ments are often more concise and easy to follow.  Both St. Thomas
and Aristotle are of the opinion that legislators instill virtue—or vice,
18 ARISTOTLE, Ethics, supra note 8, at 944 (concluding that “[w]ith those who
identify happiness with virtue . . . our account is in harmony; for to virtue belongs
virtuous activity”).
19 ARISTOTLE, Politics, supra note 8, at 1129 (“[T]he state comes into existence . . .
for the sake of a good life.”).  The good life Aristotle speaks of (euvδaimoniva, or
eudaimonia) is the same as the happiness mentioned in the quote at supra note 18 as
identifiable with virtuous activity. See also id. at 1189 (“Our conclusion . . . is that
political society exists for the sake of noble actions, and not of mere companion-
ship.”).  It is important to note that in Aristotelian moral philosophy, an action is only
virtuous with reference to the soul of the actor, accordingly as he does or does not
have the habit of virtue. ARISTOTLE, Ethics, supra note 8, at 952.
20 See ARISTOTLE, Politics, supra note 8, at 1225.  By his description, it is clear that
the deliberative element corresponds to what we call the legislative and the magistracy
corresponds to the executive. Id. at 1225–31.
21 AQUINAS, Summa, supra note 10, at 747.
22 Id. at 759.
23 See id. (“[I]f the intention of the lawgiver is fixed on . . . the common good . . .
it follows that the effect of law is to make men good absolutely.”).  The latin phrase
boni simpliciter, used here by St. Thomas, can be rendered more literally as “good in an
unqualified sense.”
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as the case may be—in their subjects by forming habits in them.24  As
a final note on this subject, it is important to note that while both of
them thought that the habituation of citizens to virtue was the end of
law, neither felt that it was the place of law to prohibit every vice,25 nor
to command every virtue.26
The preceding covers the most important arguments made in
favor of virtue jurisprudence (though it was not yet termed as such)
prior to the Enlightenment and American colonial period.  Many of
the American founders were well aware of this intellectual tradition
and adopted it to some degree in their own philosophies on govern-
ment.27  While they did not uniformly identify “general virtue,” or
even the same virtue if one was singled out, the men who played
major roles in the drafting of the Constitution and Declaration of
Independence subscribed to this theory in varying degrees.  This is
not especially surprising given the moral climate that they lived in;
many of them would not have accepted that there is what Lincoln
24 See ARISTOTLE, Ethics, supra note 8, at 952; see also AQUINAS, Summa, supra note
10, at 759.
25 See AQUINAS, Summa, supra note 10, at 792 (“[H]uman laws do not forbid all
vices, from which the virtuous abstain, but only the more grievous vices . . . and chiefly
those that are injurious to others . . . .”).
26 See id. at 793–94 (“[H]uman law does not prescribe concerning all the acts of
every virtue, but only in regard to those that are ordainable to the common good
. . . .”).  Aristotle would agree with both of these propositions based on his belief that
science of politics does not admit of perfect specificity, but rather requires prudence
and experience in order to be learned well. See ARISTOTLE, Ethics, supra note 8, at
936–37.
27 See, e.g., THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“WE hold
these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed
by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty,
and the Pursuit of Happiness—That to secure these Rights, Governments are insti-
tuted among Men, deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the Gov-
erned . . . .”).  I assume here, and I think it is at least arguable, that Jefferson (and the
signers) felt that Happiness was a life in accordance with virtue, as that was a common
sentiment at the time. See also John Adams, Thoughts on Government: Applicable to
the Present State of the American Colonies (1775), in THE REVOLUTIONARY WRITINGS
OF JOHN ADAMS 287–88 (C. Bradley Thompson ed., 2000) (“[A]ll speculative politi-
cians will agree[ ] that the happiness of society is the end of government . . . . All
sober inquirers after truth . . . have declared that the happiness of man, as well as his
dignity, consists in virtue. . . . If there is a form of government, then, whose principle
and foundation is virtue, will not every sober man acknowledge it better calculated to
promote the general happiness than any other form?”); THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at
334 (James Madison) (Robert Scigliano ed., Random House 2000) (“Justice is the end
of government. It is the end of civil society.”).
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decried as the “right to do wrong.”28  Even before Lincoln said this,
the view that there was no such right was becoming less and less com-
mon, and it now seems to have virtually disappeared.  It is common
for a modern American to be offended by the notion that the govern-
ment may interfere with his right to do what he wants—even if that
action is widely recognized as a moral wrong.  In this view, the only
permissible government intervention on such basis is not on the
grounds of the moral wrong done, but the fact that it interferes with
someone else’s rights.  This is a form of what is widely described as a
libertarian political philosophy.
Virtue jurisprudence is not dead.  It was what might have been
termed “mostly dead” for a time in the earlier part of the twentieth
century, but beginning with Modern Moral Philosophy in 1958, it has
been undergoing the gradual process of revivification.  Anscombe out-
lined the precise ways in which modern philosophy had departed
from the Aristotelian moral tradition, such that the two were finally of
little use to each other.29  From this springboard, a number of mod-
ern philosophers and political scientists have arrived at the conclusion
that the partial or total abandonment of post-Enlightenment philoso-
phy and a return to the principles of Aristotelian moral philosophy is
wise.30  Their arguments differ only in some particulars from those
outlined previously, and so for the purposes of this Note it will be
reasonable to treat them as the same.
This Section has offered a rough overview of the history of virtue
jurisprudence as it has developed from Plato to contemporary legal
thought.  The philosophy has undergone gradual modifications, but
its central tenets have remained unchanged.  These central tenets
28 Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Quincy, Illinois (Oct. 13, 1858), in THE LIN-
COLN–DOUGLAS DEBATES 262 (Dover Publ’ns, Inc. 2004).
29 See generally Anscombe, supra note 2, at 1 (“[T]he concepts of obligation, and
duty—moral obligation and moral duty, that is to say—and of what is morally right and
wrong, and of the moral sense of ‘ought,’ ought to be jettisoned if this is psychologi-
cally possible; because they are survivals, or derivatives from survivals, from an earlier
conception of ethics which no longer generally survives, and are only harmful without
it.”).
30 See generally ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL (1993) (arguing that
those with good reasons to believe an action to be immoral may indeed work to legally
prohibit that act, all for the sake of protecting the public morality, without violating
the principles of justice); ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (2d ed., 1984) (arguing
that the moral sciences have fallen into serious disrepair and are in need of rehabilita-
tion); Colin Farrelly & Lawrence B. Solum, An Introduction to Aretaic Theories of Law, in
VIRTUE JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 1 (arguing that the emphasis of jurisprudence R
should not be rights, ideology, or utility, but instead virtue, and containing articles by,
among others, Heidi Li Feldman, Antony Duff, and Kyron Huigens).
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include the notions that (1) it is the appropriate place of the state to
make laws preventing immoral acts on the basis of their immorality;
(2) the proper limits of the state in regulating morality lies not in the
right to do wrong, but in the prudential judgment that laws enforcing
morality would be counterproductive; and (3) humans can determine
what is and is not moral with sufficient certainty to make laws about it.
From here, this Note will examine the ways in which the Constitution
is consistent with this philosophy of jurisprudence.
II. THE CONSTITUTION, AMERICAN VIRTUE,
AND VIRTUE JURISPRUDENCE
A. Made for a Moral and Religious People
The Constitution, like every republican form of government,
requires a certain set of virtues among its citizens in order to function
effectively.31  While the founders did not endorse the principle that a
republican state could exert full control over the private lives of citi-
zens, they certainly believed that the state could legislate morality in
appropriate circumstances.32  Instead, their concerns with the federal
Constitution involved its scope of powers and removal from the vast
majority of citizens; accordingly, their views on what appropriate mea-
sures were for state constitutions varied widely.33
It was noted both by those who drafted the Constitution and by
later observers that one of the great difficulties in creating a federal
government was that its citizens would have such widely varied inter-
31 See JUDITH SHKLAR, ORDINARY VICES 4–5 (1984); ROGERS M. SMITH, LIBERALISM
AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 49–50 (1985); William A. Galston, Liberal Virtues
and the Formation of Civic Character, in SEEDBEDS OF VIRTUE 37–39 (Mary Ann Glendon
& David Blankenhorn eds., 1995); Harvey C. Mansfield Jr., Constitutional Government:
The Soul of Modern Democracy, 86 PUB. INT. 53 (1987).
32 See, e.g., Adams, supra note 27, at 288 (“If there is a form of government, then,
whose principle and foundation is virtue, will not every sober man acknowledge it
better calculated to promote the general happiness than any other form?”).  For evi-
dence that this conclusion includes morals laws, see id. at 292, where Adams discusses
the wisdom of laws for the liberal education of youth as well as “sumptuary” laws, or
laws designed to promote frugality and prevent extravagance and luxury.
33 Compare MA. CONST. ch. VI art. XVIII (making provision for the funding of
Massachusetts public schools, but not ratified until April 9, 1821) and id. (making no
provision for the purchase of Native American lands), with N.C. CONST. of 1776, art.
XLI (providing that the legislature “shall establish” schools for the instruction of
youth, but not providing that such schools be free) and N.C. Const. of 1776, art. XLII
(prohibiting the purchase of Native American lands except by the State Legislature).
If one spent an afternoon examining pre-1800 American State Constitutions, myriad
examples could be found; however, those cited supra serve as an example of the pro-
position that the several states needed diverse constitutions.
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ests—in part thanks to the wide expanse of land covered by the
United States.34  While the needs and goals of citizens of Georgia and
Massachusetts would be very similar at times, they would be quite dif-
ferent at other times.  It was this rationale that led the Founders to
leave the prohibition of all common law crimes to the states; it
avoided the messiness of split law.  It was not, of course, that they
found murder, arson, rape, and the like to be acceptable; instead,
they acknowledged the need for mechanisms other than a remote and
distant federal government to handle these matters.  John Adams
expressed a view common among the founders when he wrote:
[W]e have no government, armed with power, capable of contend-
ing with human passions, unbridled by morality and religion.
Avarice, ambition, revenge and licentiousness would break the
strongest cords of our Constitution, as a whale goes through a net.
Our Constitution was made only for a moral and religious people.
It is wholly inadequate to the government of any other.35
Adams understood that somehow virtue would be formed in citi-
zens, but that the federal government was wholly inadequate to
accomplish that goal.
One of the unique principles of American society which Alexis de
Tocqueville observed in his time—which he believed set it apart
instantly from European nations—was the blending of what he called
the “spirit of religion” and the “spirit of freedom.”36  These two spirits,
he believed, worked together to allow a greater society to emerge than
if either spirit overpowered the other, as was typical in nearly every
other historical example.37  The balance of these spirits emerged most
in the township, appearing to a lesser degree at each higher level
(county, state, and federal), and in the mid-1800s most American
political participation was in the township.38  The federal government,
34 THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, supra note 27, at 227–28 (James Madison); ALEXIS DE
TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 84 (Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba Winthrop
trans. & eds., Random House 2000) (1840).
35 John Adams, Letter to the Officers of the First Brigade of the Third Division of
the Militia of Massachusetts (Oct. 11, 1798), in REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES AND CIVIL
LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM HULL 265–66 (Maria Campbell & James Freeman Clarke
eds., 1848).
36 See DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 34, at 43.
37 Id. at 43–44.  In most historical societies, they tended to be dominated by
either a religious authority or a secular authority.  France is a perfect microcosm of
this phenomenon, and de Tocqueville did not fail to note the contrast between the
Americans and his own countrymen.
38 Id. at 59–65.  de Tocqueville noted that the township and its freedom came
from “the very dogma of the sovereignty of the people . . . . For all that relates to
themselves alone, the townships have remained independent bodies.” Id. at 62.
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though the Constitution substantially enlarged its powers when com-
pared with the Articles of Confederation, did not have the constitu-
tional tools to regulate or outlaw the institutions that developed these
spirits on any sort of viewpoint basis.  While the states in the early
years of the Constitution did have broad power to regulate or prohibit
such institutions, ease of passage between states ensured that citizens
would generally find the states with the most accommodating laws for
whatever their purposes might be.
Since de Tocqueville’s time, however, judicial interpretation of
the Constitution has changed to the point where it is not compatible
with virtue ethics.  In de Tocqueville’s world, the common meaning of
the Constitution, generally accepted as law, enabled the government
to foster the development of societal institutions that created virtue,
rather than ignoring or even dampening their existence.  However, in
the modern era, there are certain constitutional obstacles to either
the federal or state governments promoting civic nonpolitical institu-
tions.  In order to found our government on virtue jurisprudence
without abolishing the Constitution, it is necessary to modify or
replace these doctrines.
The first of these is the doctrine of incorporation.  It did not
make its appearance until, at the very earliest, almost half a century
after de Tocqueville’s study of America.39  Over time, the constitution-
ally guaranteed rights of freedom from establishment of religion,40
free exercise of religion,41 freedom of speech,42 of the press,43 to keep
and bear arms,44 against unreasonable search and seizure,45 against
warrantless searches,46 to a speedy and public trial by an impartial
jury,47 to assistance of counsel,48 and against cruel and unusual pun-
ishment,49 have all been held, along with others, as applying equally
against both the state and federal governments.
Of course, these rights are no longer the only ones guaranteed by
the Court through the Constitution.  In more recent times, the Court
39 See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. v.
Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
40 See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
41 See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
42 See Gitlow, 268 U.S. 652.
43 See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
44 See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
45 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
46 See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
47 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386
U.S. 213 (1967); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
48 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
49 See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
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has read the Bill of Rights to contain a right to privacy which is never
explicitly mentioned50  yet has been broadly interpreted by successive
iterations of the Court.51  This right is part of the overall package of
rights that has been selectively incorporated by the Court against the
states.  In practice, this has had the effect of substantially reducing the
amount of latitude states have in crafting laws, particularly in the
arena of what might be termed “morals legislation.”52
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in its cur-
rent form also stands against the idea that the states have stronger
power than the federal government to regulate the rights listed
above.53  The wide range of legislation struck down under the guise of
the Fourteenth Amendment encompasses at least some of the types of
50 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965).
51 See also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down statutes in Texas
and thirteen other states forbidding sodomy between consenting adults in private cir-
cumstances); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that state laws regulating
abortion run afoul of the right to privacy as outlined in Griswold, subject to certain
valid state interests and balancing tests); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969)
(invalidating state laws prohibiting private possession of materials deemed obscene
on the basis of the First and Fourteenth Amendments); Griswold, 381 U.S. 479 (hold-
ing that a Connecticut law prohibiting the use of contraceptives was in violation of the
right to privacy found through the Court’s reading of the Ninth and Fourteenth
Amendments); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding that an Oregon
statute requiring all children between eight and sixteen to attend public school was in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment). See generally Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 399 (1923) (holding that a Nebraska law restricting foreign-language education
was in violation of the Due Process Clause and that the liberty that clause protected
extended to “enjoy[ing] those privileges long recognized at common law as essential
to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men”).  In Olmstead v. United States, a case
not itself in favor of the right to privacy, an eloquent defense of the concept—and
one of its most famous—was furnished by Justice Brandeis:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to
the pursuit of happiness.  They recognized the significance of man’s spiri-
tual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect.  They knew that only a part of
the pain, pleasure, and satisfactions are to be found in material things.  They
sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions
and their sensations.  They conferred, as the Government, the right to be
left alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
52 For examples of this, see supra note 51, containing a wide variety of state stat-
utes that were previously constitutional that are now prohibited by Supreme Court
precedent.  This list does not include decisions of lower courts that invalidate state
laws on the basis of these or other privacy decisions of the Court.
53 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”).
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legislation which state legislatures might attempt to pass.54  This idea
of due process is also not the same as what some of the most influen-
tial architects and defenders of the Constitution thought of as “due
process,”55 and it also differs from the English common law meaning
of the words.56  Due process in the classical sense would encompass
those decisions of courts and acts of legislatures which were duly
passed or handed down and not in conflict with any provision of a
superior law (in our case, the Constitution).  It is easy to see how this
conception of due process grants broad discretion to legislators to
make laws, provided that they do not conflict with the Constitution.
In this sense, the nature of due process is more suited to a view that
the federal government is strictly limited to its enumerated powers,
rather than a view that constitutional provisions may be read expan-
sively to include various legislative goals which may or may not be
within the fair textual meaning of the Constitution.
54 The modern doctrine of due process finds its first notable roots, for better or
for worse, in the infamous Dred Scott case, though it had been mentioned in a decision
four years earlier in another Taney opinion.  Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19
How.) 393, 450 (1857); Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 539, 553 (1852).
Chief Justice Taney used strikingly similar language in both opinions: that acts of the
legislature in question could not possibly be regarded as due process of law. Dred
Scott, 60 U.S. at 450; Bloomer, 55 U.S. at 553.  At this point, of course, there is a long
line of case law since the 1930s supporting this principle and further elaborating on it
in various ways. See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713–714, 718–720, 722
(1931) (holding that the Due Process Clause applies to other methods of disseminat-
ing information); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369–370 (1931) (holding
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment encompasses the right of
free speech); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (holding the same); Pierce,
268 U.S. 510 (holding that the Due Process Clause applies to direction of children’s
education as well as operation of schools).
55 See, e.g., Alexander Hamilton, New York Assembly. Remarks on an Act for Regulating
Elections (Feb. 6, 1787), in 4 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 35 (Harold C. Syrett
et al. eds., 1979) (“[I]f there were any doubt upon the constitution, the bill of rights
enacted in this very session removes it.  It is there declared that, no man shall be
disfranchised or deprived of any right, but by due process of law, or the judgment of his
peers.  The words ‘due process’ have a precise technical import, and are only applicable
to the process and proceedings of the courts of justice; they can never be referred to
an act of legislature.”).
56 See, e.g., EDWARD COKE, 2 INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 45–46 (E. & R.
Brooke, 1797) (“No man shall be disseised, that is, put out of seison, or dispossessed
of his free-hold (that is) lands, or livelihood, or of his liberties, or free-customes, that
is, of such franchises, and freedomes, and free-customes, as belong to him by his free
birth right, unlesse it be by the lawfull judgment, that is, verdict of his equals (that is,
of men of his own condition) or by the law of the land (that is, to speak it once for all)
by the due course, and processe of law.”).
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The more recent interpretation of due process and its related
clauses lends itself to a more expansive reading.  In this understand-
ing, due process encompasses certain rights not written into the Con-
stitution expressly, but which are conceived to be so “implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty”57 as to necessitate being given supremacy
regardless of statutory schemes to the contrary at either the state or
federal level.  Naturally, this requires a different, nonoriginalist
approach to the text, since it requires a reading between the lines on
certain matters in order to afford the rights encompassed by due pro-
cess the status of the highest law of the land.
Why is any of this relevant to virtue jurisprudence?  Under the
current jurisprudence of the Bill of Rights, states and municipalities
are severely curtailed from making laws forbidding what they view as
evils legitimately within the purview of the states to prohibit.  In fact, it
might even be said that we are at a point of moral libertarianism:
actions may only be condemned if they infringe upon some right
enjoyed by another.  The clear upshot of this is that there are a multi-
tude of possible laws, some historically utilized by various states, which
are not permissible under the current constitutional regime, but
would be considered by some states to be necessary or useful to creat-
ing virtue in the populace.  As things stand, states’ hands are tied
beyond using laws to try to create men who are at least publicly duti-
ful, if not virtuous.  The private lives of men are unknown and
untouched by state laws.
This regime of privacy and substantive due process is far from
uncriticized.  Justice White argued in multiple opinions that the Court
has given itself too much power over the governance of the nation,
and that the creation of new substantive due process rights should be,
if anything, the exception rather than the rule.58  On the current
court, Justice Scalia, and possibly Justice Thomas, have opposed the
doctrine of substantive due process in its current form,59 despite its
expansion due to the views of a majority of Justices on the subject
during their terms on the Court.60  Even at the beginning of the
57 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), overruled by 395 U.S. 784
(1969).
58 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986); Moore v. East Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494, 544 (1977) (White, J., dissenting); Roe v. Wade, 93 S.Ct. 762, 763 (1973)
(White, J., dissenting).
59 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 589 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 382 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting)); Chicago v.
Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 85 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting); United States v. Carlton, 512
U.S. 26, 39 (1994) (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., concurring in judgment).
60 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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major expansion of substantive due process, Oliver Wendell Holmes
criticized the doctrine at the end of his time on the Court:
I have not yet adequately expressed the more than anxiety that I
feel at the ever increasing scope given to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment in cutting down what I believe to be the constitutional rights
of the States. As the decisions now stand, I see hardly any limit but
the sky to the invalidating of those rights if they happen to strike a
majority of this Court as for any reason undesirable. I cannot
believe that the Amendment was intended to give us carte blanche to
embody our economic or moral beliefs in its prohibitions. Yet I can
think of no narrower reason that seems to me to justify the present
and the earlier decisions to which I have referred. Of course the
words “due process of law,” if taken in their literal meaning, have no
application to this case; and while it is too late to deny that they
have been given a much more extended and artificial signification,
still we ought to remember the great caution shown by the Constitu-
tion in limiting the power of the States, and should be slow to con-
strue the clause in the Fourteenth Amendment as committing to
the Court, with no guide but the Court’s own discretion, the validity
of whatever laws the States may pass.61
To take the advice of these Justices, constitutional doctrine relat-
ing to privacy either needs to be rewound to its pre-Meyer state, or
revised in another direction that will allow states extra latitude.
Originalism would most likely fit this requirement, but there may also
be other models of interpretation that would allow it.  What would be
particularly relevant would be the approach of any given interpreta-
tion to the Tenth Amendment: would it side with the federal govern-
ment, allowing significant power for the federal government to strike
down “uncommonly silly law[s],”62 or would the approach give the
states the room which they need to function effectively as laboratories
of experimentation?  In fact, any constitutional model would depend
heavily on how the reader construed the Constitution.  An originalist
or a textualist could fairly read the Tenth Amendment as allowing the
states to do anything not specifically prohibited by the rest of the doc-
ument.  A proponent of the living Constitution could similarly con-
strue the document to coincide with the aims and goals of virtue
jurisprudence, allowing the states to enact morals legislation or even
for the federal government to use powers such as the Tax and Spend-
ing Clause63 or the Commerce Clause64 to indirectly affect the morals
of the people.
61 Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586, 595 (1930) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
62 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 527 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
63 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8.
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The current doctrine of substantive due process and privacy
stands directly in the path of such changes, however.  As long as any
attempt by states to make these sorts of laws is counteracted by a fed-
eral enforcement of a state laissez-faire attitude towards morals legisla-
tion—specifically, while the federal judiciary uses incorporation to
coerce the states into this attitude—our Constitution will not be com-
patible with the goal of making its citizens moral.  A different and
more federalism-oriented approach to the Bill of Rights would allow
far more latitude on the part of states to create different schemes for
establishing morality in the people.
B. Seedbeds of Virtue Bubbling Up From Below
There is another aspect to the question of virtue and its designed
source in the American republic, which requires an understanding of
the sort of world in which the Founders lived and in which America
was founded.  This world was much the same as that examined by
Alexis de Tocqueville a generation on from the Revolutionary War.
Some of the essential features of that America which bear relevance to
the development of virtue were thoroughly recounted in Democracy in
America.
The unique patriotism of Americans which de Tocqueville
observed and which he believed persisted because the people were
“still simple in their mores and firm in their beliefs,” created an envi-
ronment in which nearly every American was deeply invested in polit-
ics and the results of elections and laws.65  It is this trait, this vested
interest of every American in the success of a system into which they
had poured their own labor, that resulted in a peculiar American
character.  This trait is generally regarded as persisting around the
world even today, and it prompted de Tocqueville to comment:
“[t]here is nothing more annoying in the habits of life than this irrita-
ble patriotism of the Americans.  A foreigner would indeed consent to
praise much in their country; but he would want to be permitted to
blame something, and this he is absolutely refused.”66
Of equal importance to the fervor with which Americans attacked
the political system was the religious attitude and culture, which
informed their entire lives.  de Tocqueville noted that while there
were a wide variety of religions and sects in America that professed
different theological beliefs, each and every one of them taught “the
64 Id.
65 See DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 34, at 225–27.
66 Id. at 227.
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same morality in the name of God.”67  Indeed, as he observed on the
matter,
If it serves man very much as an individual that his religion be true,
this is not so for society. . . . [W]hat is most important to it is not so
much that all citizens profess the true religion but that they profess
a religion. . . . [A]ll the sects in the United States are within the
great Christian unity, and the morality of Christianity is everywhere
the same.68
Building on this fact, de Tocqueville later observed that
“[r]eligion . . . should . . . be considered as the first of their political
institutions . . . [because] it singularly facilitates their use of [free-
dom].”69  The reason for this was directly the morality and virtues that
American religion (and Christianity over the world) attempted to
inculcate.70  But was it the mere fact of religion, and more specifically
Christianity, that caused the phenomenon he observed?  Certainly,
the near-total uniformity of religious culture in America at that time71
(at least with regard to political religion, the topic at issue) assisted a
great deal in the efforts of religious sects to ingrain certain traits in
the young and old; but was this the only cause?  No reasonable person
would say that Christianity is the only religion capable of such forma-
tion, nor that it could only do it in a vacuum.  In fact, there were
numerous causes, some probably more important than Christianity.
Among these was the education of early Americans—which was due in
part to religious institutions.
One of de Tocqueville’s most well-known and entertaining state-
ments about American life was his moderately tongue-in-cheek obser-
vation that,
Whoever wants to judge what is the state of enlightenment among
the Anglo-Americans, therefore, is exposed to seeing the same
object under two different aspects.  If he pays attention only to the
learned, he will be astonished at their small number; and if he
counts the ignorant, the American people will seem to him the most
enlightened people on earth.72
This was an important aspect.  The cause of this near-universal
basic (and only basic) education was that the formal schooling of the
67 Id. at 278.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 280.
70 Id. (“[A]t the same time that the law permits the American people to do every-
thing, religion prevents them from conceiving everything and forbids them to dare
everything.”).
71 Id. at 278.
72 Id. at 289.
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vast majority of Americans consisted in instruction in essential educa-
tion only (reading, writing, arithmetic, and so on), and not in the sort
of philosophical free flight that was characteristic of the great Euro-
pean universities of the time.73  While that sort of education may be
more conducive to the search for objective truth, what occurred in
American schools—instruction in matters already largely assented to
on the level of faith—was much more conducive to preparing stu-
dents to live a life according to the moral code of the time: a life
embodying the classical virtues.
This life of virtue was, in de Tocqueville’s mind, one of the most
important institutions to America’s successful democratic state.  He
observed the difference in the lives of men and of the government
between the eastern and western parts of America, and concluded
that the much greater difficulty of life in the American west was due in
large part to that society’s lack of mores—mores that were present in
abundance in eastern America at the time.74  He noted that other
observers had attributed too much of the success of the American
republic to its circumstances and even to its laws, and too little to the
character of the populace.75
Finally, and related to the mores of America, de Tocqueville
observed the uniqueness of the American familial structure.  He
noted that the democratic and egalitarian character of society also
infected the family, such that American families were less hierarchical
and less formal in nature, as well as more closely bonded, than was
traditionally observed in Europe and elsewhere.76  de Tocqueville
regarded the women of American society as well-prepared to judge
the temptations of society and to share this wisdom with their
families.77
All of these observations point to the same source, a source taken
for granted by the political government of early America: the family.
73 See Hermann Ro¨hrs, The Classical Idea of the University, in TRADITION AND
REFORM OF THE UNIVERSITY UNDER AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 20 (Hermann
Ro¨hrs & Gerhard Hess eds., 1987) (observing that in the nineteenth century univer-
sity goals evolved from teaching the “regurgitation of knowledge” to “encourag[ing]
productive thinking”).
74 See DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 34, at 294–95.
75 Id. at 295.  This topic—the necessity of mores to the American Republic—was
of the highest importance to de Tocqueville.  “If . . . I have not succeeded in making
the reader feel the importance that I attribute to the practical experience of the
Americans, to their habits, to their opinions—in a word, to their mores—in the main-
tenance of their laws, I have missed the principal goal that I proposed for myself in
writing it.” Id.
76 Id. at 558–63.
77 Id. at 563.
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It is the family, often referred to as the basis or unit of society,78 from
which all of these traits come.  This is one major reason why the
authors of the Constitution were able to create a document that took
an extremely laissez-faire attitude, at least at the federal level, to gov-
ernmental involvement in matters of morals.  The Founders assumed,
as was natural for the world in which they were living, that there would
be strong families readily churning out moral citizens well-groomed
for participation in public life.  This attitude was hardly unique to
America in 1787 or in the 1830s when de Tocqueville visited.  Much
major Enlightenment thought—though it attempted to divorce
morality and faith from reason—never went so far as to presume that
the irrational basis of morality and religion meant that these things
were invalid.79
The family is far from the only factor that contributes to the fit-
ness of a society to govern itself, but it is one of the most important.
With parents traditionally being those who have the most time and
influence over their children, there can be little question that they
bear the brunt of the responsibility for the outcomes of the lives of the
children they raise.  The other important factor in the lives of chil-
dren is community, which has influence on the children both directly
and indirectly through the vehicle of the family.80  As James Q. Wilson
has noted, in the eighteenth century, American community life was
able to support families without serious regard to the type of govern-
ment in effect.81
Whereas early America had strong families and the communities
to support them, it is an open question as to whether these exist in
modern America in any substantive way.  In fact, the easiest conclu-
sion is that these social institutions are either on life support or
already effectively extinguished.  In 1960, nearly three-quarters of
78 See ARISTOTLE, Politics, supra note 8, at 1130; Mary Ann Glendon, Virtue, Fami-
lies, and Citizenship, in THE MEANING OF FAMILY IN A FREE SOCIETY (W. Lawson Taitte
ed., 1991); Don S. Browning, Altruism, Civic Virtue, and Religion, in SEEDBEDS OF VIR-
TUE, supra note 31, at 105.
79 See, e.g., DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 469 (L.A. Selby-Bigge &
P.H. Nidditch eds., Oxford University Press 1978) (1740).  While Hume argues that
value statements should never make their way into philosophical endeavors, he also
never argues that such statements do not have validity in other arenas.  This is fairly
typical of the philosophers of his time.
80 See David Popenoe, The Roots of Declining Social Virtue, in SEEDBEDS OF VIRTUE,
supra note 31, at 81–82 (arguing that a characteristic of strong families is that they are
surrounded by supportive communities, including friends, family, neighbors, and
community organizations).
81 See James Q. Wilson, Liberalism, Modernism, and the Good Life, in SEEDBEDS OF
VIRTUE, supra note 31, at 19–20.
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American households were family households.  That three-quarters
declined over the next forty years until, at the turn of the millennium,
the number had reached just over half (53%).82  Childless families
rose to 31% of all households, and of those households with children,
27% were headed by a single parent.83  As the proportion of single
parent households increased, the number of extramarital births
experienced an even more disproportionate increase.  From 1950 to
2000 the percentage of births outside of marriage jumped over 800%,
as it went from only 4% of all American births to over 33% at the turn
of the new millennium; this percentage continues to rise.84  Corre-
sponding to this decline in traditional families, and of similar impor-
tance, are the changes in social institutions and community life,
specifically those changes that affect the upbringing and socialization
of children.85  Social institutions, or those institutions which foster in-
person social intercourse, have seen their participation steadily
decline since 1950.86
These statistics paint a bleak picture of American family and com-
munity life, and therefore also of the possibility of our children
obtaining the positive social skills and virtuous behavior which are the
end of virtue ethics.  It is undoubtedly true that these changes have
corresponded nearly perfectly with the chronology of the changes in
law and Supreme Court precedent discussed above.  However, it
would be far too simplistic to attribute the declines to these changes
alone.  American society is far too complicated and subject to far too
many causes to make such a confident connection.  However, a more
restricted federal government which gives greater latitude to state gov-
ernments to make and enforce laws as they feel their particular cir-
cumstances would require, would give effective tools to the states to
promote the inculcation of virtue through the traditional power of the
family and its related societal and communal institutions.
What de Tocqueville observed as enabling the success of Ameri-
can society was then, and still is, a cause of a successful republic, but
82 HERBERT S. KLEIN, A POPULATION HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 210 (2004).
83 Id. at 210–11.
84 Id. at 213.
85 See Steven Mintz, The Family as Educator: Historical Trends in Socialization and the
Transmission of Content Within the Home, in EDUCATION AND THE AMERICAN FAMILY 110
(William J. Weston ed. 1989) (arguing that the ways in which children socialize had
undergone more radical change post-1960 than at any time in the previous hundred
and fifty years).
86 See generally ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE (2000) (arguing that there
has been a decline in social institutions and social capital, as well as in-person social
intercourse, since the midpoint of the 20th century).
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any republic may choose to create laws, which serve to create, facili-
tate, or quash love of country, universal education, religious belief,
and strong families.  All these things, so noted and admired by de
Tocqueville, were present virtually everywhere in American society
both in his time and when the Constitution was framed.  Hardly any-
one would argue that what is now left of these things resembles what it
did in de Tocqueville’s time.  Restoring these traits and the institu-
tions that can create them will require governments that lend a sympa-
thetic hand to such endeavors, rather than neutrality or
discouragement.
C. Man is Not Governed by Angels: The Structural Government
and the Virtue of Lawmakers
One of the most well-known aspects—as well as one of the most-
revered—of the Constitution is the doctrine of separation of powers.
As James Madison wrote, “the accumulation of all powers, legislative,
executive, or judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or
many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly
be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”87  Tyranny of those in
power over the populace was certainly a major reason for this doc-
trine.  However, there is another purpose for which the separation of
powers doctrine may be used.
James Madison famously wrote in the Federalist Papers that “[i]f
men were angels, no government would be necessary.  If angels were
to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government
would be necessary.”88  The behavior of lawmakers is eternally a prob-
lem for any government, and the Founders were certainly aware of the
difficulty.89  An obvious effect of the separation of powers is just what
Madison noted: by counterbalancing interest with interest, internal
87 THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 27, at 307–08.  Of course, Madison and the
other Founders were hardly supporting an original doctrine in their idea of separa-
tion of powers; it was held by Enlightenment political scientists to be one of the most
important elements of preserving freedom for the people. See, e.g., CHARLES DE
SECONDAT MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 155–56 (Anne M. Cohler, Basia C.
Miller & Harold S. Stone trans. & eds., Cambridge University Press 2006) (1748).
88 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 27, at 331.
89 See, e.g., Adams, supra note 35, and accompanying text.  This quote, it seems,
can be applied to this topic in two ways.  The first, which is used supra, is that the
people who lived under the Constitution must be moral in order for it to function
effectively.  However, the other applies to those given power to carry out the govern-
ment: as Madison put it, where better motives are lacking or defective, then they may
be supplied by creating “opposite and rival interests.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra
note 27, at 332 (James Madison).
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controls on government were created that should keep each branch
of the government at bay.  But was this a means of keeping base and
vicious men from tyrannizing each other?  In light of the state of
American society at the time and the type of men who lived there, it
hardly seems that this was the case.  Rather, in light of the type of
culture in America, as well as Adams’s aforementioned assessment of
the Constitution’s need for a religious people,90 it seems more likely
that even otherwise good men were not to be trusted with the power
to rule over others, and therefore the “helping hand” of the separa-
tion of powers was necessary.
This may seem like an ambitious re-imagination of the doctrine
of separation of powers.  However, regardless of the beliefs of those in
the past, this doctrine can be understood as a means of maintaining
lawmakers in virtue as well as preventing them from succumbing to
vice.  In fact, it makes more sense understood in this way, rather than
as a means only of preventing base and impetuous legislators, judges,
or executives from trampling over the rights of the public by setting
them against each other.  If such men are conniving enough, they will
easily find means of circumventing such restraints and safeguards—
the easiest way of doing this would be to simply conspire with other
governmental departments (or under the U.S. Constitution, for the
federal and state governments to conspire) to ignore constitutional
restraints and protections.  It is hardly the case that even virtuous
lawmakers will not be subject to the same temptations and passions,
since no one is perfect.  Rather, by placing lawmakers into situations
where they have clear and visible barriers—even if the barriers are in
some sense only intellectual—to violating the rights of others, we give
them the tools they need to effectively legislate as virtuous men.
CONCLUSION
  The philosophical foundation of the Constitution has been dis-
cussed and debated for most of American history.  Beyond certain
ideas that formed the foundation of the document—for example,
rights—the Constitution has been interpreted as consistent with any
number of different theories of government and societal goals.  In this
respect, a project to reinterpret and re-found the Constitution on the
philosophy of virtue jurisprudence would not be a new endeavor.
However, it would be a marked departure from the modern trend
towards deontology and utilitarianism; if it could be successfully
90 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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implemented, it might indeed have many positive effects on American
society—especially in the arena of families and small communities.
These benefits would be in addition to the benefits the govern-
ment would obtain from virtue ethics.  A free society, which operates
under a free government, requires citizens who will make good
choices about their own government.  If it is indeed possible for gov-
ernment to foster virtue in the citizens, it will thereby be ensuring its
own effective functioning for so long as citizens maintain their virtue.
